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I. JURISDICTION 
This court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal in this matter 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Section 78-2(a)-3(2)(f). 
II. NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from the Fourth Judicial District Court in and 
for Utah County, State of Utah wherein appellant entered a guilty plea to 
the charge of manslaughter. After sentencing, the defendant made a 
motion to withdraw his plea of guilty. A hearing was held before the 
Honorable Boyd L. Park and the motion to withdraw the guilty plea was 
denied. 
III. ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1) Whether the trial court followed the procedures prescribed 
by the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, No. 11. 
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2) Whether the defendant's plea of guilty was in fact entered 
knowingly and with a full knowledge and understanding of its 
consequences and of the rights he was waiving. 
3) Whether the trial court properly concluded that the 
appellant had knowingly and understanding^ entered his plea of guilty. 
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
CONSIDERED DETERMINATIVE 
1. U. C. A. 77-35-11 (e) (4). 
V. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant Frank Gene Powell was charged with criminal 
homicide, murder in the second degree. Ultimately, the appellant entered 
a plea of guilty to an amended information charging criminal homicide, 
manslaughter. The appellant received an indeterminate sentence of one to 
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fifteen (1 to 15) years in the Utah State Prison. By motion, the appellant 
sought to withdraw his plea of guilty. A hearing was held before the 
Honorable Boyd L. Park and the motion to withdraw the guilty plea was 
denied. 
VI. RELEVANT FACTS 
On November 30, 1987, a warrant of arrest was authorized by 
Judge Joseph Dimick charging the appellant with criminal homicide murder 
in the second degree. 
On December 4, 1987, the appellant appeared with his attorney 
before Judge Lynn W. Davis for arraignment. 
A preliminary hearing was held in this matter on February 23, 
1988, before Judge Lynn W. Davis. The defendant was present with his 
attorney. The court heard and considered the evidence of the state and 
entered its order binding the defendant over the Fourth Judicial District 
Court for arraignment. Arraignment occurred before Judge Boyd L. Park 
-3-
on March 4, 1988. The defendant again appeared with counsel. He 
entered a not guilty plea and trial was set for May 23, 1988. 
The appellant next appeared before Judge Boyd L. Park on May 
20, 1988, at which time he asked leave to withdraw his not guilty plea and 
expressed his intention to enter a guilty plea to an amended information to 
be filed by the state wherein he would be charged with criminal homicide, 
manslaughter. The court granted the appellant's request, the state filed its 
amended information and, pursuant to plea negotiations, the appellant 
entered his guilty plea to the charge of manslaughter. Present with the 
appellant at the time he changed his plea was his attorney, Bradley P. Rich. 
On July 22, 1988, the appellant appeared before the court, with 
counsel, for sentencing and received an indeterminate sentence of one to 
fifteen (1 to 15) years in the Utah State Prison. 
By motion date September 28, 1989, the appellant sought to 
withdraw his guilty plea on the grounds that his plea was not made 
knowingly and with full understanding of the various constitutional rights 
he would be waiving with the entry of such a plea. 
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The matter was heard before Judge Boyd L. Park, and after 
hearing the evidence, having reviewed the court file, together with 
transcripts, the court denied the appellant's motion to withdraw the guilty 
plea. 
VII. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Rule 11 (e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure requires the 
court to make certain findings before accepting a plea of guilty. The court 
has the duty of ascertaining that the defendant is entering his guilty plea 
with full knowledge and understanding of the rights he is waiving. In this 
case, the trial court relied on the representations of defense counsel and 
the affidavit of the defendant, instead of conducting its own independent 
inquiry to make sure the appellant had a full understanding of what his 
guilty plea connotated and its consequences as required by State v. 
Gibbons. 740 P.2d 1309 (Utah 1987). 
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VIII. ARGUMENT 
The appellant seeks to withdraw his plea of guilty for the reason 
that he did not fully understand the effect of his plea and the various 
constitutional and statutory rights he was waiving. 
It is clear from a reading of the transcript of the appellants 
guilty plea and the hearing on his motion to withdraw his plea, that he was 
unable to read the English language above a second grade level and did not 
attempt to read the affidavit submitted to the Court in connection with his 
guilty plea. 
At the hearing in connection with his plea of guilty, the following 
relevant discussion took place: 
Mr. Rich: "He has gone through the 9th grade . . . as a 
practical matter he reads at a second or third 
grade level because of that I have been over him 
every paragraph of this and [sic] feels that he 
understands it. He does not feel comfortable 
reading such a document, but I have read it to 
him." [T-4] 
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The Court: "You have been over this statement with your 
attorney in some detail and you understand that 
you are waiving certain constitutional rights when 
you plead guilty." 
Defendant: "Yes." 
The Court: "Those constitutional rights have been fully 
explained to you by Mr. Rich?" 
Defendant: H^V~~ « "Yes 
The Court: "You have initialed each of those appropriate 
paragraphs?" 
Defendant: " T T ^ , , »t "Yes 
The Court: "And you are willing at this time to acknowledge 
that those paragraphs are true and accurate?" 
Defendant: ""\7"^« •» "Yes 
The Court then received the following statement from the 
Deputy County Attorney of the factual basis for the charge: 
Ms. Ragan: "Yes Your Honor on this date November 29, 1987, 
the defendant and the victim were both at a party 
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along with a number of other persons. During the 
course of the night the defendant and the victim 
both were there and there was some drinking 
going on and some conflict between the two 
individuals, some fighting, verbal fighting and that 
sort of thing. They went out to the parking lot at 
one point and the defendant entered his vehicle. 
The victim was standing in the parking lot. He 
circles the parking lot and came around and 
struck the victim. The medical examiner 
determined that the cause of death was that blow 
from the truck." 
The Court: "Have you heard a statement of the facts as 
recited by the County Attorney Mr. Powell, is that 
a true and accurate statement?" 
Defendant: "Yes." 
The Court: "If it is your intent to plead guilty you may sign 
that statement." 
(WHEREUPON, the defendant signs the statement.) 
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After a statement by the Court on the acceptability of the plea 
bargain, the Court made the following finding prior to accepting the guilty 
plea from the defendant to manslaughter. 
The Court: "Yes thank you. The record may show that the 
court has received a statement of the defendant 
before pleading guilty. That he has appropriately 
initialed each of the paragraphs. This statement 
has been signed by those parties required to sign 
the same. The court will affix its signature. 
The court has further received an affidavit of 
counsel signed by Mr. Rich in this matter. The 
court will order those documents to be made a 
part of the file. 
The above statement by the court, along with the affidavit of the 
defendant are the sum total of the record relevant to compliance with Rule 
11 (e) of the Utah Code of Criminal Procedure. 
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Rule 11 (e) (Utah Code Ann. §77-35-11 (e) (1987)) in relevant 
part, provides: 
The Court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty . . . and shall 
not accept such a plea until the court has made the findings: 
(1) That the plea is voluntarily made; 
(2) That the defendant knows he has rights 
against compulsory self-incrimination, to a jury 
trial and to confront and cross-examine in open 
court the witnesses against him, and that by 
entering the plea he waives all those rights; 
(3) That the defendant understands the nature 
and elements of the offense to which he is 
entering the plea; that upon trial the 
prosecution would have the burden of proving 
each of those elements beyond a reasonable 
doubt; and that the plea is an admission of all 
those elements; 
(4) That the defendant knows the minimum 
and maximum sentence that may be imposed 
upon him for each offense to which a plea is 
entered, including the possibility of the imposition 
of consecutive sentences; and 
(5) Whether the tender plea is a result of a prior 
plea discussion and plea agreement and if so, 
what agreement has been reached 
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"Rule 11 (e) squarely places on trial courts the burden of 
ensuring that constitutional and Rule 11 (e) requirements are complied 
with when a guilty plea is entered." State v. Gibbons. 740 P.2d 1309, 1312 
(Utah 1987). In Gibbons, the Utah Supreme Court clarified the law 
concerning the taking of guilty pleas in all trial courts in Utah and 
established a strict Rule 11 (e) compliance test in the acceptance of guilty 
pleas. Id.. Under Gibbons, trial courts may no longer rely on defense 
counsel's advice or executed affidavits to satisfy the specific requirements 
of Rule 11 (e) but rather, "with or without an affidavit or defense counsel's 
advice, the trial court must conduct on-the-record review with defendant 
of the Rule 11 (e) requirements." State v. Vasilacopulos. 756 P.2d 92, 94 
(Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
Gibbons requires the trial court to conduct its own independent, 
formal inquiry to "make sure that the defendant has a full understanding 
of what the plea connotes and of its consequences." Gibbons. 740 P.2d at 
1312. 
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The Gibbons court noted: 
"Some trial courts attempt to satisfy the requirements for 
taking a guilty plea by using a written affidavit. However, 
the affidavits are not uniform throughout Utah, and trial 
judges often rely on defense attorneys to inform their clients 
of the contents of the affidavit . . . because of the importance 
of compliance with Rule 11 (e), . . . the law places the burden 
of establishing compliance with those requirements on the 
trial judge. It is not sufficient to assume that defense 
attorneys make sure that their clients fully understand 
the contents of the affidavit." I& at 1313. 
In State v. Valencia. 112 Utah Adv. Rep. 42 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), 
the Utah Court of Appeals observed the following: 
"When an affidavit is used to evidence defendant's 
knowledge and willingness to plead guilty, the trial 
court's examination of defendant regarding the 
affidavit's contents should be sufficiently detailed and 
extensive to proved a factual basis to conclude from 
defendant's responses that his decision was knowing 
and voluntary. His understanding of the elements of the 
charges and the relationship of the law and the facts may 
not be presumed from a silent ox incomplete 
examination. (Citations omitted). Id., at 44. 
In Gibbons , the Utah Supreme Court did not suggest that a 
written affidavit or plea form be used in every case. But, if such an 
affidavit or form is signed by the accused and used as part of the guilty 
plea to evidence his or her understanding of the charged offense and the 
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waiver of certain rights, that statement cannot serve as a mere substitute 
for the full and complete examination on the record by the trial court that 
is required by the rule. Gibbons. 740 P.2d at 1312-14. 
"The use of a sufficient affidavit can promote efficiency, 
but an affidavit should be only the starting point, not 
an end point in the pleading process . . . the trial judge 
should then review the affidavit with the defendant, 
question the defendant concerning his understanding of 
it and fulfill the other requirements imposed by §77-35-11 
on the record before accepting the guilty plea." 
id- at 1313-14. 
The Court also observed that: 
"The procedure may take additional time, but 
constitutional rights may not be sacrificed in the name of 
judicial economy." Id.- at 1314. 
In State v. Vasilacopulos. 756 P.2d 92 (1988), this court, after an 
analysis of the state of the law in Utah regarding the duty of the trial court 
in accepting guilty pleas, made the following observation: 
" . . . trial courts may not rely on defense counsel 
or executed affidavits to satisfy the specific requirements 
of Rule 11 (e). Rather, with or without an affidavit or 
defense counsels advice, the trial court must conduct 
an on-the-record review with the defendant of the 
Rule 11 (e) requirements. Id., at 94 
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This court, in Vasilacopulos. noted that the Utah Supreme Court 
in State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309 (1987) had, in effect: 
" . . . replaced the prior record as a whole test with 
a strict Rule 11 (e) compliance test in accepting a 
defendant's guilty plea." Id. at 94 
It is appellants position that the strict compliance test is the 
present standard of review and is, therefore, applicable in this case. 
However, it is appellant's contention that the record in this case does not 
rise to the standard required by either test. 
The record of the inquiry by the trial court of the defendant as 
required by Rule 11 (e) shows the following deficiencies: 
(1) There was no dialogue about or finding made that the 
defendant knew he was waiving his rights against compulsory 
self-incrimination, to a jury trial and to confront and cross-examine in 
open court the witnesses against him, as required by Rule 11 (e) (3). 
(2) There was no inquiry by the court as to what the nature 
and elements of the offense to which the defendant was pleading guilty 
and as to whether or not the defendant understood those elements. 
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There was not statement or finding by the trial court that 
the defendant knew and understood that at trial the State would have the 
burden of proving each of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt. 
There was no discussion of or finding that the defendant knew a plea of 
guilty was an admission of all those elements. All of the above is required 
by Rule 11 (e) (4). 
(3) There was no discussion about or finding that the 
defendant knew the maximum and minimum sentence that could be 
imposed, as required by Rule 11 (e) (5). 
(4) There was no finding that the plea was voluntarily made, 
as required by Rule 11 (e) (2). 
An examination of the record of the defendant's plea shows that 
there is a complete lack of compliance by the trial court with the 
requirement of Rule 11 (e). It is clear from the record that the trial court 
relied on the defendant's attorney's explanation of the affidavit, in spite of 
the fact that the defendant could not and had not read the affidavit. 
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The lower court in ruling on the motion did not apply the strict 
compliance test, but erroneously applied the "record as a whole test." (See 
finding 6 of the courts decision.) 
A review under the "record as a whole test", compels the same 
conclusion as the defendant urges above. 
In Jolivet v. Cook. 115 Ut. Adv. Rep. 17 (1989), the Supreme 
Court, in a case upholding a lower courts finding by 'clear and convincing 
evidence1, that Jolivet had knowingly and voluntarily entered his guilty 
plea, said: 
" . . . the absence of a finding under [Rule 11] is 
not critical so long as the record as a whole affirmatively 
establishes that the defendant entered his plea with full 
knowledge and understanding of its consequences and 
of the rights he was waiving." Id., at 18. (emphasis added) 
The only factual support for the courts ruling is that the defendant's 
attorney had gone over the affidavit with the defendant and his attorney 
felt that the defendant understood the contents of the affidavit. There was 
no findings by the trial court, nor any basis established for the findings 
required by Rule 11 (e), even after an examination of the "record as a 
whole." 
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In his decision denying the defendant's motion to withdraw his 
plea, the court basically weighed the testimony of the appellant that he did 
not understand the rights he was waiving by pleading guilty against the 
testimony of the defendants attorney that he had read the defendant the 
affidavit and he felt the defendant understood the consequences of his 
plea. (See decision.) Such a comparison is irrelevant. The focus must be 
on the defendant's understanding at the time the plea was entered as 
shown by the findings of the court. 
IX. CONCLUSION 
Based on the authorities presented, appellant seeks an order of 
this court directing that his plea of guilty be withdrawn and have the same 
remanded to the court for trial. 
DATED this 2£ day of June, 1990. 
STEPHEN R. McCAUGHEY 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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